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Abstract 
Since 2005, the EU ETS has provided a market-based price signal for European carbon emissions.  
This article reviews the literature on the formation of carbon allowance prices during Phase II of the 
EU ETS. A consensus has emerged in the literature that allowance prices are driven by fuel prices and 
other variables that affect the expected amount of abatement required to meet the EU ETS 
emissions cap. However, this relationship is not robust, most likely because the relevant abatement 
technologies change with the economic conditions in which they operate. There is evidence that 
models that explicitly account for uncertainty about the future demand and supply of allowances are 
better at explaining allowance price variation during certain periods. However, our understanding of 
the level of the allowance price remains poor. We cannot say with any degree of confidence whether 
the allowance price is “right,” in the sense that it reflects marginal abatement costs, or whether 
there is a price wedge caused by uncertainty, transaction costs, or price manipulation. Nevertheless, 
we find that the EU ETS market has matured in Phase II compared to Phase I, and that banking of 
allowances has induced the market to incorporate the future scarcity of allowances and, as intended, 
to smooth the effect of temporary shocks. We argue that further research is needed in several key 
areas to increase our understanding of the emissions allowance market provided by the EU ETS.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a multinational cap and trade system1 
that has been operating for more than ten years and is currently in its third phase (2013-2020). The 
EU ETS provides an institutional framework for market forces to determine the price of carbon 
emissions in energy-intensive industrial sectors in Europe. It is not only the central instrument for 
Europe’s climate policy, but also a globally observed experiment on whether emission abatement can 
be achieved efficiently. Recent initiatives aimed at linking the EU ETS during Phase III with other 
emission trading schemes (e.g., New Zealand, South Korea, and Switzerland) have bolstered hopes 
that the EU ETS is the precursor to a truly global carbon market.  
Generally speaking, the goal of emissions trading is to achieve a given emissions target at least cost 
by equalizing marginal abatement costs across firms (e.g., Montgomery 1972, Tietenberg 1985). 
Profit-maximizing firms will reduce emissions as long as this is cheaper than purchasing allowances 
on the market, and vice versa. The efficient allowance price is equal to the cost of reducing emissions 
to one unit below the emissions cap, which is generally referred to as the market’s marginal 
abatement cost. This means that efficient abatement decisions require reliable allowance prices that 
reflect all available information on the cost of reducing emissions to achieve the cap. The role of 
allowance prices in indicating whether emissions trading works (i.e., achieves the target at least cost) 
has spurred a sizeable literature on price formation for EU ETS allowances. This article, which is part 
of a symposium on the EU ETS,2 reviews the literature on allowance price dynamics and levels, 
focusing in particular on empirical analyses of Phase II (2008-2012) of the EU ETS.  Our review 
includes papers that cover a range of issues associated with allowance price determination. Given 
the size of the current literature and space limitations, this review could not be exhaustive. Instead 
1 A cap and trade system is a market-based approach to controlling pollution/emissions where the regulating 
authority sets an overall emissions cap, or limit. This cap is divided into allowances, which give the holder the 
right to emit one unit of emissions (e.g., one ton of CO2), and distributed among the market participants. 
Allowances can be traded freely, and every market participant is required to surrender one allowance per unit 
of verified emissions.  
2 The other articles in this symposium are Ellerman, Marcantonini and Zaklan (2016), which introduces the 
symposium and provides an overview of the EU ETS, and Martin, Muûls and Wagner (2016), which examines 
the impacts of the EU ETS at the firm level. 
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we focus on contributions that provide new insights or are representative of a larger set of papers 
and their findings, and ignore those that are only loosely related to allowance price formation. 
Where appropriate, we have also included papers that are themselves literature reviews.  We 
generally gave preference to papers that we believe are based on the most rigorous and reliable 
methodological approaches currently available. In addition, we do not explicitly assess or compare 
the quality of these studies. Rather we let the studies speak for themselves and invite readers to 
examine these studies and draw their own conclusions.   
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide background on 
the dynamics of allowance prices in Phase II of the EU ETS, by first discussing how marginal 
abatement cost theory determines the fundamental factors that influence allowance prices and then 
reviewing the empirical evidence on allowance price dynamics, including studies explicitly addressing 
the role of uncertainty. However, price changes are only one factor in allowance price formation. The 
focus of the next section is the price level, which is just as important but has received much less 
attention in the literature because of the lack of an observable counterfactual for business as usual 
(BAU) emissions.  The final section suggests priorities for future research and offers some conclusions 
about how the EU ETS has performed from a market perspective.  
ALLOWANCE PRICE DYNAMICS  
In efficient markets the allowance price will be determined by supply and demand. The supply of 
allowances is primarily determined by policy decisions such as the level of the emissions cap, linkages 
to other emission markets, and rules about banking and borrowing. Because supply decisions 
predominantly affect the price level, we focus on factors determining allowance demand here and 
discuss supply decisions in detail in the next section. We begin by presenting the fundamentals for 
allowance prices and then discuss the empirical literature that aims to measure the extent to which 
changes in these fundamentals affectthe allowance price. 
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Price Fundamentals 
The fundamentals that in theory determine the allowance price can be divided into those that 
determine “business as usual” emissions and those that determine marginal abatement costs.  
Business-as-usual emissions  
The main drivers of the demand for allowances are business-as-usual (BAU) emissions in the sectors 
covered by the EU ETS. These emissions are driven primarily by economic growth and the economy’s 
energy efficiency and (carbon) emission intensity (i.e., emissions/GDP). In the short term, BAU 
emissions are also driven by weather variation through their impact on the demand for heating or 
cooling3 and on power generation from renewables (e.g., Considine 2000, Alberola et al. 2008, 
Hintermann 2010).  For example, Scandinavia experienced an exceptionally dry year in 1996. As a 
result, Danish carbon emissions almost doubled compared to 1996 levels, because instead of 
importing carbon-free hydropower from Sweden and Norway, Denmark exported carbon-intensive 
coal-based power to those countries (Christiansen et al. 2005).   
Marginal abatement costs 
The  second driver of allowance prices are the available abatement options and their costs. Based on 
survey data, Heindl and Löschel (2012) find that during Phase II, process optimization and investment 
in energy efficiency were the most popular abatement options. Because these investments affect the 
price level of allowances but not daily fluctuations, the literature focuses on fuel switching prompted 
by the change in the “merit order” of electricity generation (i.e., the order in which generators are 
brought on line, usually based on lowest cost) as the most relevant short-term abatement option 
(e.g., Christiansen et al. 2005, Kanen 2006, Bertrand 2014). Due to the structure of the electricity 
sector in Europe, fuel switching is expected to take place mainly between coal and gas.   
3 The relationship between temperature and energy demand is U-shaped (Bunn and Fezzi 2008), with 
temperatures below a certain threshold leading to an increase in energy demand for heating purposes and 
temperatures above a certain threshold leading to an increase in energy demand for cooling purposes.  
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Under perfect competition, power providers will base their supply bids on marginal generation costs. 
The cost of carbon emissions (i.e., the allowance price) should induce fuel switching between all 
available generators as long as the implicit abatement cost does not exceed the allowance price. This 
implicit abatement cost is known as the “fuel-switching” price (in Euro per ton CO2).4  
Fuel switching can take place either within a firm or across generators owned by different firms. 
Using data from eight European countries between 1978 and 2004, Pettersson et al. (2013) present 
evidence for fuel switching, notably in countries with a high proportion of gas, coal, and oil 
generation. In general, an increase in the gas/coal price ratio increases the fuel switching price, which 
should result in an increase in the allowance price, to the extent that fuel switching is indeed a 
relevant form of emissions abatement.  
Empirical Evidence on Allowance Price Formation in the EU ETS 
This subsection summarizes the empirical evidence for the influence of different factors on allowance 
price formation.5  The studies we examined vary both in their geographic coverage and with respect 
to the time periods covered, the selected price variables, and the representation of weather 
variables. This makes it difficult to directly compare the magnitude of the studies’ results.  Across all 
studies, economic activity and growth announcements as well as the oil price are found to positively 
influence allowance prices on an intra-day, daily, weekly, and monthly basis.6 In the discussion that 
follows, we examine the influence of gas, coal, and electricity prices, the influence of renewable 
energy supply, and the ability of allowance banking to smooth the shocks that result from these 
4 Formally, the fuel switching price is:  gas gas coal coalfs
coal gas
P P
P
E E
η η⋅ − ⋅
=
−
 
where Pgas and Pcoal represent the gas and coal price (in Euro per MWh fuel), respectively, η is the 
corresponding heat rate (in MWh fuel per MWh electricity), and E the emission factor (in tCO2 per MWh 
electricity). 
5 For an overview of the studies we examined in this section, see Appendix Table 1. 
6 There is no consensus on whether the influence of the oil price is due to it being a proxy for economic activity, 
natural gas prices, or (limited) fuel switching from oil to gas (Pettersson et al., 2013).   
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factors.  We focus on evidence from Phase II, but refer to results from earlier years where 
appropriate.7  
Energy prices 
Across all the studies that we reviewed, the natural gas price (if explicitly included) is found to have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on allowance prices. However, this is not the case for the 
coal price. Whereas Aatola et al. (2013) find a negative influence of the coal price, Lutz et al. (2013) 
find a positive influence during certain periods.8 Koch et al. (2014) and Fell et al. (2015) find the 
influence of the coal price to be insignificant. Empirical studies that use energy prices to explain 
allowance price dynamics commonly rely on one price to represent oil, gas, and coal. However, the 
coal market is still much less integrated than the gas and oil market, and power utilities might simply 
not face the same coal price in their decisions about fuel switching (Zaklan et al. 2012 and Schernikau 
2010, respectively).  Using a broad set of coal, gas, and oil prices, Rickels et al. (2014) confirm in 
particular that different coal price series explain different aspects of allowance price dynamics. Thus, 
the oversimplified assumptions concerning the European energy market that underlie the empirical 
studies may be at least partly responsible for the mixed results on the influence of energy prices. 
Moreover, not all studies include the electricity price in their analysis, which means that some of the 
coal price results could be explained by omitted variables.  
The possibility that electricity, fuel, and allowance prices are jointly determined has motivated 
several authors to use cointegration analyses to examine the long-term relationship between energy 
and carbon prices. In contrast to methods where fuel prices are interpreted as predetermined 
fundamentals for the allowance price, in a cointegration analysis, all prices are allowed to be 
determined endogenously. Focusing exclusively on fuel and allowance prices, Creti et al. (2012) find 
that fuel and allowance prices are cointegrated (i.e., share a common trend). However, they also find 
7 See Zhang and Wei (2010) for a more detailed review of the various studies of allowance price dynamics 
during Phase I. 
8 Using a Markov-switching regime, they find that the coal price has a significant positive influence in the first 
regime, but a negative influence in the second regime. However, the latter is significant only at the 10 percent 
level.  
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that the cointegration relationship appears to significantly explain allowance price dynamics only 
during certain periods of the second phase. Using monthly data, Koch et al. (2014) do not find 
cointegration between allowance and fuel prices. Rickels et al. (2014) emphasize that the 
identification of a cointegration relationship is sensitive to the specific fuel price series selected, and 
argue that conditional on the “right” combination of prices and estimation methodology, statistically 
significant cointegration can be found, but might not (yet) necessarily represent an economically 
meaningful long-term relationship between allowance and fuel prices.   
Studies that include the electricity price find more robust cointegration relationships between 
electricity, fuel, and allowance prices.9 However, including the electricity price requires a segmented 
approach to the EU ETS market because national power markets are not yet fully integrated across 
the EU. Fell et al. (2015) use a multi-country framework to investigate cointegration between fuel, 
electricity and allowance prices not only within, but also between different electricity markets. They 
identify equilibrium relationships between electricity, allowance, and fuel prices, but these 
relationships differ across markets due to differences in fuel mixes in electric generation.   
Delarue et al. (2010) argue that although fuel switching is likely to be observable during some hours 
of the day, it cannot be easily observed in the daily aggregated price series. Moreover, the time-
series approach for identifying the influence of fuel prices on allowance price dynamics cannot 
capture all of the channels underlying fuel switching during the course of the day (i.e., different 
generators can substitute for one another at different times of the day).  This issue may increase in 
importance as the demand for fossil-based generation decreases as more renewables enter the 
system.  
9 Examples include Bunn and Fezzi (2008) for the UK, Fell (2010) for the Nordic market, and Lo Prete and 
Norman (2013) for Germany.   
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Renewable energy supply and weather variation 
To determine the impact of hydropower on allowance prices, Rickels et al. (2014) examine reservoir 
levels in Nordic countries and confirm their negative influence on allowance prices.10 Fell et al. (2015) 
provide indirect evidence for this effect by finding that reservoir levels are negatively correlated with 
the electricity price, which in turn is positively cointegrated with the allowance price. This result is 
confirmed by Aatola et al. (2013), who use Nordic reservoir levels to instrument for electricity prices, 
which are positively correlated with the allowance price. In contrast, Koch et al. (2014) find that the 
supply of hydropower has no significant influence on allowance prices. However, their data does not 
include hydropower provision in Scandinavia and focuses on production rather than storage levels.11  
Rickels et al. (2014) find that short-term variation in wind power provision in Germany, Denmark and 
Sweden has no robust effect on the allowance price. In contrast, Koch et al. (2014) report a 
significant negative influence of wind and solar electricity supply (based on monthly data) in Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Portugal, and Spain. Lutz et al. (2013) include variations 
in daily temperature, but find no significant influence on the allowance price. Rickels et al. (2014) and 
Koch et al. (2014) confirm this result using variations in electricity consumption to account for 
weather driven demand variations. These results indicate that long-term changes (e.g., an increase in 
renewable capacity) affect the allowance price, whereas short-term shocks (e.g., due to weather) do 
not.  This can be explained by allowance banking, to which we turn next.   
Banking of Allowances 
Banking and borrowing allow for the smoothing of demand and supply variations of allowances over 
time. Shocks -- such as an increase in energy demand resulting from heating during a cold spell, or an 
increase in energy supply resulting from a temporary surge in wind power -- are likely to be canceled 
out by shocks of similar magnitude but opposite sign that occur at some point in the future. Such 
10 This was previously identified for Phase I by Hintermann (2010) and Fell et al. (2010). 
11 Although an increase in hydro generation can reflect either an increased supply of hydro power or an 
increased demand for all electricity, a larger than normal reservoir level clearly indicates an increase in supply 
in the medium to long run.   
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shocks are known as “mean-reverting” -- i.e., they are temporary deviations from a long-term 
average to which they will eventually return.  Mean-reverting shocks do not affect the cumulative 
amount of abatement required to comply with the long-term emission cap. Thus, their effect on the 
allowance price depends on banking rules.  
Hintermann (2010) and Bertrand (2014) show that in the absence of banking across phases, 
variations in price fundamentals translate into stronger variations in  allowance prices at the end of a 
trading phase. This is because it is increasingly less likely that temporary shocks will be counteracted 
by a later shock of the opposite sign during the remainder of the phase. Since the beginning of Phase 
II, there have been no restrictions on the transfer of allowances from one period to the next. 
Borrowing from the next phase is not allowed, but as long as a positive amount of allowances is 
banked from one period to the next, a shock that temporarily increases emissions can be countered 
by a reduction in the amount of banked allowances.  In this sense, firms can “quasi-borrow” from the 
amount of allowances that they planned to bank. Given the over-supply of allowances in Phase II, the 
borrowing constraint was not binding during the transition to Phase III. 
Banking and (quasi-)borrowing imply that marginal abatement cost theory applies to cumulative 
expected abatement costs rather than to the daily abatement decision because banking and 
borrowing should eliminate the impact of such shocks to the cumulative expected allowance 
demand, since these shocks will cancel out over time. This is consistent with the results discussed in 
the previous subsection. In contrast, Hintermann (2010) reports a significant relationship between 
weather shocks and allowance prices during Phase I, when banking was not allowed.   
The Role of Uncertainty  
While the studies discussed so far show that observed fundamental factors appear to affect 
allowance prices (mostly as predicted by theory), their combined results indicate that only a certain 
fraction of allowance price dynamics can be explained and that the degree of explained variation 
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varies significantly over time.12 Most importantly, these studies do not account for the uncertainty 
that characterizes various price determinants. In particular, future fuel prices and other observable 
allowance price drivers are uncertain; unforeseen demand variations mean that BAU emissions are 
also stochastic. This suggests that the allowance price should reflect the expectations of market 
participants about allowance scarcity, including the associated uncertainty. In this section, we first 
discuss studies which show that the selling and buying of allowances is driven not only by the present 
deterministic cost but also by future uncertain marginal abatement costs. Clearly, uncertainty varies 
over time, suggesting that to explain allowance price dynamics, it is important to consider different 
approaches for different periods (regimes). Thus, we discuss this issue next. Finally, we discuss the 
carbon finance literature, which examines purely data-driven approaches.  
The option value of holding an allowance  
When a firm faces uncertain future abatement costs (e.g., resulting from uncertain BAU emissions), it 
can postpone its abatement decisions until more information becomes available by holding an 
allowance. This is particularly relevant if abatement decisions involve irreversible investment in 
abatement technology. Thus, depending on its abatement costs, the firm has the (real) option of 
either using the allowance for compliance or selling it at the end of the period (e.g., Chao and Wilson 
1993, Schennach 2000, Chesney and Taschini 2012). This means that the allowance price should 
exceed the marginal abatement costs by this real option value. This also explains why, if there is the 
expectation of an over-allocation of allowances (i.e., more allowances than expected emissions), 
then a non-zero probability of exceeding the EU ETS cap is sufficient for the allowance price to 
remain positive (even without the possibility of banking) (Seifert et al. 2008, Chesney and Taschini 
2012).Clearly, the uncertainty about non-compliance with the cap shrinks towards the end of the 
compliance period, implying that the (real) option value of allowances is highest at the beginning of 
the trading phase. If the allowance price includes the (real) option value, then it becomes a poor 
12 Most studies include dummy variables for certain dates to reflect that fundamental factors influence 
allowance prices differently through time, implying that different regimes can be defined for the behaviour of 
market participants. 
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indicator of current marginal abatement costs, suggesting that deterministic studies have a limited 
ability to explain allowance price dynamics (Carmona et al. 2009).  
Hintermann (2012) examines allowance price dynamics during Phase I and considers the case where 
the firm does not undertake abatement. In this case, holding an allowance can be interpreted as 
exempting the firm from paying a penalty if the cap is exceeded. This makes holding an allowance a 
binary (i.e., “all or nothing”) option. Hintermann (2012) finds that an option pricing formula that 
depends on a penalty for non-compliance and the probability of emissions exceeding the cap 
explains a significant proportion of the variation in allowance prices in Phase I as well as the slowly 
declining value of allowances toward the end of the phase, even in the face of apparent over-
allocation. This suggests that the allowance price during Phase I may have been driven by 
expectations about stochastic emissions rather than marginal abatement costs. To the best of our 
knowledge, no similar analysis has been conducted for Phase II.  
Changes in uncertainty over time  
As we have explained, the uncertainty, and therefore the real-option value, shrinks toward the end 
of the trading phase. However, shocks with implications for BAU emissions also alter the degree of 
uncertainty, suggesting that allowance trading can be characterized by different “regimes”. While in 
certain periods of high uncertainty, a regime might prevail in which the option value describes large 
parts of the allowance price dynamics, other periods with less uncertainty might reflect a regime in 
which variations in fundamentals like fuel prices are largely responsible for allowance price dynamics. 
Lutz et al. (2013) apply an empirical model that explicitly accounts for the possibility that different 
underlying regimes are at play in determining allowance price dynamics (i.e., a regime-switching 
model). They distinguish between two regimes, one representing a market characterized by high 
uncertainty (high price volatility) without a clear price trend and one representing a market 
characterized by less uncertainty (lower price volatility) and a clear price trend. They show that 
during periods of less uncertainty, market fundamentals explain a large fraction of allowance price 
dynamics and that the coal price has a negative influence on the allowance price (which was not the 
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case in the earlier (single-regime) base model).  Moreover, they show that the high-volatility regime 
appears to explain price dynamics during the economic recession in 2008 and 2009 and they argue 
that declining emissions were responsible for the increasing uncertainty about whether the 
emissions cap was still binding. Chevallier (2011) and Koch (2014) reach similar conclusions, finding 
that market fundamentals affect allowance price dynamics differently during different time periods 
and that the link between allowance prices and fundamentals generally became more robust in the 
second phase compared to the first phase.13 These studies suggest that a) including uncertainty is a 
promising area for future research on allowance price dynamics and b) uncertainty varies across time 
as illustrated by regime-switching models. By allowing for regime switches, these models are less 
restrictive in their underlying assumptions regarding market behavior than approaches such as 
cointegration. However, by relying on a purely data-driven identification of different regimes (e.g., 
volatility), regime switching models do not provide information concerning the fundamental drivers 
underlying the switching between regimes. Thus, in order to understand allowance price dynamics, 
further economic analysis is needed to interpret the results of these models.    
Financial analysis of allowance price dynamics  
Allowances are more than a physical commodity traded by emitting firms in order to balance 
abatement across the EU ETS; they are also a financial commodity traded for profit (or hedging 
purposes) by other market participants.  Thus, in what has become known as the “carbon finance” 
literature, models from the financial assets and commodity fields are applied to the issue of 
allowance dynamics. These models also follow a more data-driven approach, focusing in particular on 
the volatility of allowance prices. Paolella and Taschini (2008) were the first to show that 
autoregressive models,14 which are commonly used in the context of financial asset assessment, are 
also well suited to describing the heteroscedasticity and unconditional tail distribution in allowance 
13 Instead of a regime-switching model, Koch (2014) uses a smooth transition conditional correlation GARCH 
model.  
14 In an autoregressive model, the outcome variable (or alternatively, the error term) depends on its own 
previous values and a random term.  
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price series.15 Benz and Trück (2009), Chevallier (2011), Feng et al. (2011), and Conrad et al. (2012) 
investigated and confirmed the partially stochastic behavior of allowance prices when there is 
clustering of volatility (e.g., periods of high volatility). Daskalakis et al. (2009) and Gronwald and 
Ketterer (2012) allow for the possibility of price jumps, and Gronwald et al. (2011) estimate the 
relationship between allowance prices and financial markets by using copulas—a method that 
relaxes the assumptions concerning the underlying error structure.16 Although it is not always 
straightforward to interpret the results of econometric studies that are not based on theoretical or 
conceptual models, what is clear from this literature is that even though the scarcity of CO2 emissions 
allowances is institutionally induced, the allowance market itself appears to function very much like 
other commodity markets.  
THE CHALLENGE OF ANALYZING ALLOWANCE PRICE LEVELS  
The somewhat ambiguous empirical results concerning allowance price dynamics may simply reflect 
inefficiencies in an immature market. However, these results may also be due to the fact that some 
economic, institutional and technical factors influence price levels rather than price dynamics. Thus, 
in this section we examine the empirical literature that either directly or indirectly considers the 
allowance price level. In particular, we first discuss the general problem of the complex interactions 
between the allowance price, the quantity of BAU emissions, and the cap and then turn to banking 
and borrowing, other climate policies, such as support for renewable energy and the link to the 
Kyoto Protocol market, and finally to inefficient trading that results from transaction costs or 
imperfect competition, all of which have implications for the allowance price level.   
15 They show that the volatility pattern of EU allowances can be described well by applying generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models.  
16 A detailed assessment of this rapidly growing literature would be useful but is beyond the scope of this 
article. 
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Abatement Costs and the Price-Quantity Relationship  
The (deterministic) empirical literature discussed in the previous section assumes a stable 
relationship between economic fundamentals and the allowance price. However, this assumption is 
unlikely to hold in general because there is a complex interaction between BAU emissions, 
abatement quantities and allowance prices. To provide some intuition, consider the economy-wide 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve that ranks different methods for reducing emissions according 
to their abatement costs. The marginal abatement technology, i.e., the method used to reduce 
emissions by one ton below the cap, depends on the required abatement amount, which is the 
difference between BAU emissions and the emissions cap. This abatement amount is not fixed, but 
rather depends on a series of variables, including input prices. Suppose that there is a change in the 
price for natural gas. This may change not only the marginal abatement cost of a given technology, 
but also BAU emissions, due to the substitution of input fuels, thus causing a different abatement 
technology to be on the margin. This indicates that the marginal effect measured by the studies 
discussed in the previous section actually reflects two effects that are not individually identified: a 
relative price effect (a change in the level of the MAC curve) and a quantity effect (a movement along 
the MAC curve).   
Whereas the quantity effect may be negligible when estimating the effect of marginal changes in 
price fundamentals over a short period of time (assuming that the marginal technology remains the 
same or at least similar), it does not bode well for our ability to predict the effect of non-marginal 
changes. For example, if the EU were considering a 20% reduction in the future emissions cap, the 
studies discussed in previous sections would be of little use in predicting the resulting allowance 
price, even if some of them include proxies for economic activity in order to control for BAU 
emissions. This is because the relevant abatement technologies at the new equilibrium may be quite 
different from those that set the allowance price under the old cap. Empirical studies find that 
regulatory announcements concerning the stringency of the cap affected allowance prices in Phase I 
(Alberola et al. 2008, Conrad et al. 2012, Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo 2011) as well as in Phase II 
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(Mansanet-Bataller and Sanin 2014, Koch et al. 2014), thus confirming the relevance of quantity 
effects. However, because market participants’ expectations cannot be observed, and moreover may 
not be accurate in hindsight, this type of ex-post analysis does not allow us to predict the price level 
in response to a projected change in expected abatement amounts or costs.  
One way to analyze the price-quantity interactions related to abatement is to use numerical 
simulation models that can produce MAC curves for the entire EU ETS or to compute the effects of 
different abatement and policy scenarios on the allowance price. For example, increasing the 
required emission reduction from 20% to 30% in 2020 (relative to emission levels in 1990) has been 
estimated to result in an approximate doubling of the allowance price (Saveyn et al. 2011, Bosello et 
al. 2013). Whereas simulation models can, in principle, address the price-quantity relationship of 
abatement, their results are reliable only to the extent that their assumptions about BAU emissions 
under various economic conditions and the underlying MAC curve are accurate. However, for both 
BAU emissions and the underlying MAC curve, reliable data are not available. It is precisely this lack 
of information about firms’ abatement costs and amounts that is the main argument made in favor 
of a market-based approach to emissions reductions (as opposed to “command-and-control” 
measures). 
Implications of Banking for the Price Level  
The potential to transfer allowances between phases implies that it is the overall long-term cap, 
rather than the phase-specific cap, that will determine the path of the allowance price. If there is no 
uncertainty, efficiency implies that firms will abate emissions and bank and borrow allowances so 
that the allowance price increases at the rate of interest (e.g., Rubin 1996). Banking and borrowing 
links the allowance price levels in different periods and thus enables firms to smooth their 
abatement costs over time. The presence of uncertainty does not change the qualitative nature of 
abatement smoothing, but it can provide additional incentives for banking if firms seek to hedge 
against emission risk. Without banking and borrowing, hedging becomes more expensive (Schennach 
2000, Daskalakis et al. 2009).  
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The positive allowance prices that prevailed toward the end of Phase II indicate that market 
participants were banking allowances into Phase III because of their awareness of regulatory 
uncertainty and their expectation of an overall short position in future years. For example, Trück et 
al. (2014) find that during Phase II, firms were insuring themselves against rising allowance prices.17  
Thus, as discussed earlier, allowance prices reflect both expectations about the future condition of 
the market and the risk premium required in order to hold allowances. 
Other Policies with Implications for the Allowance Price Level 
In general, any policy affecting emissions from installations or sectors participating in the EU ETS can 
be expected to affect the demand for emission allowances and hence allowance prices. This is 
particularly true of carbon or energy taxes and policies designed to promote energy efficiency and 
renewable energy (Fischer and Preonas 2010, Böhringer and Behrens 2015 2003).  
As a result of various national policies supporting renewables (e.g., feed-in tariffs or quotas for 
renewable energy), the share of electricity from renewable sources in the EU-28’s gross electricity 
generation rose from 14.8 percent in 2005, when the EU ETS began, to 25.4 percent in 2013 (Eurostat 
2015). A large share of renewable energy still comes from hydropower (43.4 percent in 2013), but in 
2013, the share of wind power in electricity from renewable sources had reached 27.5 percent, 
whereas solar power accounted for 10 percent. The remainder comes mainly from biomass and 
biogas.  
Following the EU’s decision to set a target of achieving a 20 percent share of energy from renewable 
sources in energy consumption by 2020 (European Union 2009), a number of studies simulated the 
effects of this additional target on the EU allowance price. These studies show a wide range of 
allowance price reductions under different renewable energy support scenarios (e.g., De Jonghe et 
al. 2009, Traber and Kemfert 2009, Böhringer and Rosendahl 2010). The empirical study by Koch et 
17 Specifically, they show that during Phase II, the market changed from initial backwardation to contango. 
Contango is a situation in which the expected spot price at a future date is below the futures (or forward) price 
for the same commodity; backwardation describes the opposite situation (i.e., futures prices are below the 
expected spot price).   
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al. (2014), which examines the extent to which renewable polices can explain the allowance price 
drop in mid-2008, finds only a very modest effect.  
Another policy that affects the allowance price level is the link to the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible 
mechanisms (i.e., the Clean Development Mechanism, CDM and Joint Implementation, JI), which 
allows firms to use a limited number of Kyoto offsets to cover their emissions in lieu of EU 
allowances.18  This policy creates an additional supply of allowances and hence lowers equilibrium 
price levels.  To trace the potential effect of Kyoto offset use on allowance price levels, we again have 
to rely on numerical simulation studies rather than on econometric analysis. Klepper and Peterson 
(2006) and Anger (2008) show that allowance prices would be between 30 and 50% lower with offset 
use than without offset use.  
Transaction Costs and “Thin” Trading 
The strong presence of market intermediaries providing services to firms covered by the EU ETS 
implies that transaction costs may be important, especially for small firms that do not have 
specialized units that deal with emissions abatement and allowance trading. Transaction costs, and 
the resulting low-level – or “thin” – trading, suggest that even when the allowance market is 
supposed to be in surplus, there may be an insufficient supply of allowances in the short run. In fact, 
installations with a combined allowance allocation of almost 30 percent of the total EU ETS cap did 
not engage in any trade through April 2007, effectively removing this quantity of allowances from the 
market (Hintermann 2015).19  Only about 51 and 54 percent of German firms covered by the EU ETS 
were involved in trading in 2009 and 2010, respectively, and almost two-thirds of those that did 
trade did so only once a year (Heindl 2012). In particular, although small firms tend to hold a surplus 
of allowances, transaction costs appear to deter them from trading (Jaraitė et al. 2010, Heindl 2012). 
18 Kyoto offsets are carbon credits generated from CDM (i.e., Certified Emission Reductions -- CERs) and JI 
(Emission Removal Units -- ERUs) projects. See the EU’s “Linking Directive” (EU, 2004) for details. 
19 Because trading data are kept confidential for five years (recently reduced to three), the corresponding figure 
for Phase II is not yet known.  
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If firms with an allowance surplus do not offer to sell their allowances, the resulting market price will 
be inefficiently high.  
Thin trading may cause a market to be inefficient because not all available information is reflected in 
the price.  Montagnoli and de Vries (2010) report persistent allowance price trends during Phase I. In 
an efficient market, such trends should not exist because the price should include all available 
information, making it impossible to predict the next day’s price. However, the results also indicate 
that efficiency increased during Phase II. Crossland et al. (2013) investigate the extent to which the 
EU ETS market can be regarded as “weakly” efficient in the sense that prices are not predictable. 
Using daily spot prices from 2008 to June 2011, they investigate whether it was possible to earn 
profits by inferring future prices based on recent price history. They find that, in the short term, 
allowance prices are characterized by momentum (whereas there is evidence for reversal) in the 
medium term.20 In the long term (up to 12 months), the market again displays under-reaction and 
the momentum that goes with it. The authors conclude that the EU ETS market is not yet 
information-efficient. Likewise, Daskalakis (2013) reports that simple technical analysis rules (i.e., 
trading strategies based on momentum and reversal) could have generated substantial risk-adjusted 
positive returns from 2008 to 2009, whereas  there were signs of growing market efficiency starting 
in 2010. The possibility of systematic profitable trading and the lack of informational efficiency is also 
shown by Niblock and Harrison (2013) and Aatola et al. (2014), who use data from 2008 until 2012 
and 2008 until 2010, respectively.    
Market Power 
We would expect market power to affect the allowance price level by leading to a price that is either 
below or above marginal abatement costs.  Laboratory experiments indicate that market power may 
negate some or all of the gains from trade in emission allowance markets (Godby 2002, Cason et al. 
2003). Empirical studies of the U.S. sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide markets find no evidence for 
20 Price momentum occurs if price changes on consecutive days are positively correlated. In contrast, price 
reversal (or price correction) describes a situation where a price decrease is followed by a price increase, and 
vice versa.  
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market power (for a review, see Montero, 2009), but these studies were looking for signs of 
allowance price depression due to large net buyers. The largest firms in all existing emission 
allowance markets are electricity generators.  
An important difference between the EU ETS and the US allowance markets, which has implications 
for market power, is the degree of liberalization in the electricity sector and its consequences for cost 
pass-through.  Whereas most US electricity markets are subject to price regulation (such that the 
electricity price does not respond to short-term changes in input prices), European electricity 
markets have been liberalized in the sense that the electricity price is determined in a daily auction 
and thus, at least in theory, is based on marginal production costs.  A number of empirical studies 
find that in many European countries, the full carbon cost is passed through to electricity prices (Sijm 
et al., 2008; Fabra and Reguant, 2014; Hintermann, 2014; Fell et al., 2015). The combination of free 
allocation of allowances and cost pass-through can lead to an increase in firms’ profits due to the 
introduction of an allowance market, a phenomenon which has been labeled “windfall profits” in the 
literature (Sijm et al., 2006; Lise et al, 2010).21 Hintermann (2011) shows that the profits of all major 
EU electricity firms were an increasing function of the allowance price.  This is confirmed empirically 
by Oberndorfer (2009), who finds that in Phase I of the EU ETS, the allowance price was positively 
correlated with the stock prices of European electricity firms, and by Bushnell et al. (2013), who 
report a similar result for a larger set of firms. These results suggests that the exercise of market 
power by electricity firms, which are the only likely candidates to wield such power in the EU ETS and 
which acted as net allowance buyers, would lead to a higher allowance price level.  Similarly, De Feo 
et al. (2013) show that strategic competition between upstream (electricity generators) and 
downstream firms (industry) generally leads to allowance prices exceeding marginal abatement 
costs.   
21 Because allowances constitute a required input for production and can be sold on the market if unused, they 
will be reflected in the product price like any other valuable input. Cost pass-through is therefore not a sign of 
market inefficiency; rather it is a sign of a competitiveness. A lack of cost pass-through would indicate the 
presence of a large markup that can be adjusted to absorb the carbon cost.  
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There can never be conclusive proof of market power because there are always alternative 
explanations for firms’ behavior.  However, Hintermann (2015), shows that the largest electricity 
firms accumulated excess allowance holdings during Phase I of the EU ETS, which is consistent with 
strategic over-purchasing of allowances (and under-abating of emissions) in order to drive up the 
allowance price. These results suggest that market power is policy-relevant, especially in new 
markets characterized by thin trading, generous free allocation, and high cost pass-through.   
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH   
Our review of the literature indicates that substantial progress has been made in increasing our 
understanding of emission allowance markets, through the use of various approaches, data, and 
methods. Despite these advances, major gaps remain in our knowledge. In this section, we propose a 
research agenda aimed at filling these gaps. These research priorities include analyzing the 
interactions between energy markets and the EU ETS, further examining the drivers of price levels, 
and developing a more refined model of allowance trading.  
Analyzing Interactions between Energy Markets and the EU ETS 
As indicated by the cointegration studies discussed earlier, prices for electricity, fuel inputs, and the 
allowance price are determined jointly. Unfortunately, current models do not allow for the 
relationship between prices to change over time. This may be crucial given that marginal generation 
technologies can be expected to evolve as more renewables enter the system, and the cap is 
continually adjusted. Thus, the development of econometric techniques that allow for a time-varying 
relationship among co-determined prices would be useful.  Moreover, our understanding of the 
interactions among energy markets can only be as good as our understanding of the functioning of 
the individual markets themselves. The coal market in particular is poorly understood, because the 
cost for coal that is relevant for power generators may exhibit substantial spatial heterogeneity due 
to transportation costs.  In addition, our understanding of electricity markets and the marginal 
generating units is far from complete.   
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Predicting Price Levels 
Our understanding of the relationship between the abatement effort induced by the cap and the 
resulting price level relies on only a few simulation analyses and thus remains limited, especially 
concerning the data on allowance price dynamics. This makes it difficult to assess the effect of 
interactions with alternative EU climate policies, linkages with Kyoto and other markets, and the 
sensitivity of the price to the setting of future caps, all of which are crucial for improving the design 
of the EU ETS. Moreover, it prevents economists from speaking authoritatively about whether the 
price signal provided by the carbon market is approximately right or there is some deviation between 
price and (intertemporal) marginal abatement costs that may be explained by factors such as 
transactions costs, high aversion to engaging in risky abatement decisions under uncertainty, or 
imperfect competition. Unfortunately, research that improves our understanding of the efficient 
price level is anything but low-hanging fruit: any effort to understand the price level relies on 
knowledge of BAU emissions and firms’ abatement costs, both of which are unobserved and thus 
must be modeled. Simulation models that incorporate detailed information about economy-wide 
abatement opportunities and a realistic representation of firms’ abatement and production choices 
would allow us to develop a better understanding of the relationship between the cap and the 
resulting price level.  In addition, research about transactions costs or the degree of competition 
could help us to assess the magnitude of price distortions and thus the likely loss in efficiency.   
Determining the Efficient Amount of Trading  
Transaction costs appear to play an important role in the EU ETS, especially for smaller firms. 
Although the amount of allowance trading that takes place is one proxy for the presence of 
transaction cost, low levels of trading can also be a sign of an efficient initial allocation. To our 
knowledge, no study has addressed the question of how much trade would be efficient, conditional 
on an initial allowance distribution and the uncertainty regarding production and abatement 
decisions. Research on this issue would enable us to infer the importance of transaction costs or 
other market imperfections from the actual level of trading observed.   
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Concluding Remarks  
Although the EU ETS has been criticized from an environmental perspective because of its rather low 
carbon price signal, we believe that the policy has actually performed quite well from an economic 
point of view. It introduced a single price for emissions, which were previously a free public “bad”, 
and it correctly reflected the substantial over-supply of allowances in both Phase I and Phase II 
through a significant price drop. Moreover, the non-zero price toward the end of Phase II, despite a 
nonbinding cap for the phase, reflected expectations of a cap on overall emissions that is binding in 
the long term, given the opportunity to bank allowances. Remarkably, this development took place 
during a significant economic crisis that also caused turmoil in other markets. Viewed from this 
perspective, the EU ETS proved its flexibility with respect to changing economic conditions by 
reducing the carbon costs during a period of economic stress. This would not have been possible with 
a rigid command-and-control approach or with a carbon tax, although the latter would probably have 
achieved a greater reduction in emissions. In addition, because the experience of the first two phases 
resulted in efficiency-increasing adjustments—for example, the central allocation of allowances and 
the move towards auctioning in Phase III—continued collaboration between research and policy is 
likely to further improve the functioning of the market.  
As is currently being discussed in the EU, the low allowance price could be counteracted through the 
use of new mechanisms such as price floors or strategic allowance reserves. However, a more direct 
(and environmentally beneficial) approach would be to tighten the cap, for example, by adjusting the 
rate at which it is decreased after 2020; because of banking, this should affect the price even today.  
We would argue that the fact that allowance prices turned out to be lower than anticipated (and 
thus EU climate policy was cheaper than expected) should actually be interpreted as good news 
rather than a problem. After all, the main economic argument in favor of an emission allowance 
market is that it delivers a particular emissions goal at least cost.   
The EU ETS will likely never become a fully efficient—and therefore idealized—market, but rather a 
compromise between economic theory and political reality. Market efficiency critically depends on 
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the attention firms devote to optimizing their abatement and trading decisions in response to 
allowance prices. Current allowance price levels may not make the effort worthwhile, but 
presumably this will change in light of the (likely) stricter future emission targets that will be 
necessary to achieve the EU’s climate goals.  Thus, we would argue that although the EU ETS does 
not function perfectly in every detail, it has nevertheless lived up to many of its expectations and has 
proven to be a successful application of economic theory to an important environmental issue.   
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Appendix Table 1: Empirical studies on the deterministic influence of market fundamentals on EUAs during Phase III 
Study Period Approach Data Explanatory variables/ Non allowance price variables in endog. frameworks Dummies 
Conrad et 
al. (2012) 
11/2006—
12/2010 
Autoregressive estimation with 
fractionally integrated asymmetric 
power GARCH; analysis of 
announcement effects with 
differences of realized and expected 
figures. 
Intra-day Lags on announcement data for: 
EC's decisions on second NAPs, DE Ifo index, DE ZEW index, EU consumer confidence, DE new 
orders, EU new orders, U.S. ISM manufacturer index, U.S. Uni-Michigan index adv., DE industrial 
production, EU industrial production, FR industrial production, GB industrial production, U.S. 
nonfarm payrolls 
Creti et al. 
(2012) 
01/2005—
12/2010 
Cointegration estimation and 
comparison of observed and 
simulated carbon prices 
daily Fuel prices: calculated fuel switching price and oil price 
Economic activity: stock index 
04/25/2006 
Aatola et 
al. (2013) 
01/2005—
12 /2010 
Time series, GARCH, IV, and VAR 
estimation with variation in 
inclusion of explanatory variables 
(general to specific approach) 
daily Fuel prices: coal and gas price 
Economic activity: stock index, end product prices of paper, steel, minerals 
IVs for electricity: water reservoir levels Nord Pool area; gas storage levels in UK  
Instrument variables for economic activity: oil price  
04/27/2007  
04/27/2006 
05/16/2006 
Lutz et al. 
(2013) 
06/2005—
12/2010 
Time series and Markov-switching 
regime with GARCH 
daily Fuel prices: gas, coal, and oil price 
Economic activity: stock index, commodity index, and a yield spread  
Weather variables: deviation from average temperature 
No 
deterministic 
breaks  
Fell et al. 
(2015) 
01/2007—
12/2011  
ARCH; single- and multi-country 
VECM  
weekly Fuel prices:  coal and gas prices 
Other: electricity prices in Germany, France, Netherlands, Nord Pool area, and 
Spain for peak and baseload 
 
Koch et al. 
(2014) 
01/2008—
10/2013 
Time series and cointegration 
analysis with robustness check 
including additional variables 
monthly Fuel prices: gas, coal, oil, and calculated fuel price 
Economic activity: stock index, Economic Sentiment Indicator (Eurostat), 
Industrial Production Index—Manufacturing 
Weather related variables: hydro, solar, and wind power feed-in in Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Portugal, Spain;  electricity consump. 
Other: number of issued offsets (CER) 
Seasonal 
dummies,  
7 monthly 
dummies 2011 
– 2013a 
Rickels et 
al. (2014) 
01/2008—
07/2012 
Specific-to-general time series 
analysis, cointegration and VECM 
estimation  
daily Fuel prices: various gas, coal, oil, and calculated fuel switching prices 
Economic activity: stock index 
Weather related variables: electricity consumption, wind power feed-in in 
Germany, Denmark and Sweden; hydropower feed-in in France, Sweden, and 
Norway; reservoir levels in Norway, Spain, and France  
 
a Jan 2011: ban on the use of certain CERs; Jun 2011: proposal for energy efficiency directive; Aug 2012: intention to link EU ETS with Australia; Nov 2012: backloading 
proposal; Dec 2012: report on structural options to strengthen the EU ETS; Mar 2013: green paper on the 2030 framework; Apr / Nov 2013: first / second vote by European 
Parliament on backloading proposal  
